For some time there has been a growing number of scholars who have begun to see the classification “religion,” and its relation to the equally interesting category “secular,” to have a practical effect on the ways in which people in Europe and North America think and act—not to mention those who have been impacted by our exported economic and political systems. Perhaps this is best phrased by the anthropologist Talal Asad, in his recent book, *Formations of the Secular*: “What interests me particularly,” he writes,

> is the attempt to construct categories of the secular and the religious in terms of which modern living is required to take place, and nonmodern peoples are invited to assess their adequacy. (2003: 14)

If, as Mary Douglas demonstrated so long ago (1991), the distinction between soil and dirt refers *not* to some essential feature in the objects being classified but, instead, is an effect of the group of classifiers who employ the distinction as a means of establishing a particular world comprised of a system of dos and don’ts, then the group of scholars to which I refer are interested in the social effects of those common distinctions that go by such names as religion/politics, sacred/secular, faith/practice, and private/public. These classifications are understood to be used *not* because of their uncanny ability to identify some feature in the objects so named, but because, once entrenched in minds, actions, and social institutions, they enable people to distinguish themselves from others and, in the process, to form self-identities and allocate (or
withhold) material and social capital.

This shift in scholarly focus—from studying politics and religion to studying the politics of the category “religion”—may, at first, sound counter-intuitive. For it has become a truism of the so-called modern world that such terms as religion, faith, and belief correspond to some deeply human(e) aspect of spirit, consciousness, or human nature. Moreover, it is also widely assumed that, prior to the so-called European Enlightenment’s efforts to desacralize the world, everyone was uniformly religious and that, since then, the dynamic spirit of piety has been co-opted, forced to take a back seat to the dogmatic rule of confining secular sanctions. According to this familiar storyline, the Church has succumbed to the State and the grandeur that was religion has been reduced to matters of personal faith and private opinion (as most recently argued by Richard Horsley [2003]). Given the widespread nature of these assumptions, many of those who are interested in studying the history of the classification “religion” anticipate a day when faith will rise up against the dragon of tradition and defeat it—an image all the more fitting given that I presented a version of this paper last Spring in Arizona State University on St. George’s Day, a holiday long associated with celebrating Christianity’s triumph over paganism.

As evidence of the widespread nature of these truisms, consider a recent textbook entitled, World Religions Today (Esposito, Fasching, and Lewis 2002). In an introductory section entitled, “Understanding Religious Experience and its Expressions,” the authors request their undergraduate readers to picture themselves in ancient Rome, asking someone on the street: “What religion are you?” Not letting their admission that people in antiquity did not speak English stand in their way, they press on with their example: “Frustrated, you try rephrasing your question and ask: ‘Are you religious?’ Suddenly their faces light up and they smile and say, ‘Of
This example strikes me as having something remarkably in common with the stereotypical paternalism of English tourists who think that if they just spoke loudly and slowly enough everyone would understand them. For, in the process of acknowledging the historicity and thus inherent limitations of their categories, these authors nonetheless presuppose that the adjectival form of the modern noun is a predicate of all human beings. What’s more, it’s not just any old predicate but, quite possibly, the most authentically human quality of all. For, as they conclude:

Religion as a form of human experience and behavior ... is not just about purely “spiritual” things... [W]hatever powers we believe govern our destiny will elicit a religious response from us and inspire us to wish “to tie or bind” ourselves to these powers.... (7)

Despite the fact that many people seem to think that the model of religious studies represented by the work of Mircea Eliade has shuffled off this mortal coil—and that scholarly criticisms of this model are pathetically tilting at antique windmills—Eliade told us pretty much the same several decades ago: everyone is religious, whether they know it or not. We can therefore hear faint echoes of Juliet proclaiming that “by any other name a rose would smell as sweet.” Or, updating Shakespeare, we could quote David Denby, film reviewer for The New Yorker, commenting on the films of Quentin Tarantino: “a filmed image has a stubborn hold on reality. An image of a rose may be filtered, digitally repainted, or pixilated, yet it will still carry the real-world associations—the touch, the smell, the romance—that we have with roses” (213).

But anyone familiar with such films as “Pulp Fiction” or “Kill Bill” will know that, as Denby goes on to write, “Tarantino wants us to give up such [real-world] associations.” Scholars
who take the historical and the social far more seriously than textbook authors also want us to
give up a few of our cherished associations, such as the presumption that “religion” and its
associated concepts are anything but historical accidents to which we have become accustomed
when going about the business of living in the modern world. But going down this road means
that some of our peers who think they are doing history must relinquish not only their cherished
metaphysic but also some political assumptions concerning the ability of their local concepts and
curiosities to set a universal table at which some posited communion of saints can happily feast.
But few are willing to give up such things; instead, they reverentially chronicle the etymology of
their categories while continuing to assume that behind their acts of historical imagination there
lurks an enduring, universal presence that transcends time and place—some Esperanto that will
finally let everyone understand each other. Sadly, the history that such scholars offer does not go
very far, for their readers are told that behind the transitory world of appearances there is an
enduring permanence lodged deeply within the immutable confines of this thing we call
experience or human nature.

Feeling overly secure in this metaphysical confidence, we then become perplexed when
so-called religious people do what we take to be bad things, as in when those people we term
fundamentalists commandeer, let’s just say for the sake of argument, jet airliners and fly them
into crowded buildings. Anyone who watched television or read newspapers after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, will know that making sense of such human behaviors understandably poses
a considerable interpretive challenge for those who rely on the common, folk conceptions of
religion and politics—and, lucky for them, countless pundits are up to the challenge,
authoritatively wielding such loaded notions as “cult” and “fanatic” as if such terms were neutral
descriptors of stable states of affairs that, once deployed, will help us to safely orient ourselves in a dangerous world. Of course we don’t ask “Safe for whom?” and we do not entertain that so-called fanatics are merely putting their own preferences into practice, much as those in dominant groups routinely do. In turn, this allows us to avoid entertaining that the conditions that make possible our social world might be understood by others—correctly or not, in our opinion—as a form of coercive behavior that, like it or not, must be met with provocative retaliatory violence. No, such things can never be entertained for, as Noam Chomsky has succinctly phrased it in his most recent book, “that would require at the very least a willingness on the part of the educated classes to look into the mirror instead of restricting themselves to lamentations on the crimes of official enemies” (2003: 53). Accordingly, the challenge of understanding the possible motivations and effects of provocative actions is met with grandiose theories of social deviance and religious extremism, speculations premised on the distinction between religion and politics, between belief and practice, between essence and manifestation, and between pristine origins and degraded expressions—distinctions that conveniently enable us to dismiss any so-called anomalous and uncivil behaviors before ever seriously studying them.

If, as I’m suggesting, discourses on origins, principles, spirit, and faith are not innocently concerned with deeply moral, timeless, other-worldly issues, but are instead profoundly this-worldly social rhetorics, then the hotly contested debates over what gets to be named as “religion” should draw our attention to the set of assumptions “in terms of which,” to quote from Asad once again, “modern living is required to take place.” For, much as the presumably eternal and uniform intentions of the Founding Fathers are invoked whenever a catastrophe is thought to befall the U.S. (a point made by Darnton 2003: x), the rhetorical appearance of an essential and
uniform inner trait is evidence of a boundary under contest. In fact, signifiers such as faith or experience, used as if they correspond to some invisible, inner quality, may be among the best examples of what Sarah Vowell—that wonderfully ironic contributor to National Public Radio’s “This American Life”—likens to a soybean: “a versatile little problem-solver that can be processed into seemingly infinite, ingenious products” (2002: 5). Although she was speaking of the virtually limitless uses for the rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address,” the modernist invention of the concept of religion, and the so-called civil nation-state that is said to result once a wall of separation is erected between the political and religious spheres, is an even better candidate for the title of “versatile little problem-solver.” For the truisms that we call “religion,” “faith,” “opinion,” “principle,” and “belief,” nicely process socio-politically enmeshed human beings into distinct, self-absorbed, and seemingly disembodied believing souls, all the better for getting on with the everyday work of social formation—which is none other than the art of ensuring conformity of behavior and organization while providing the fiction of a socially safe site where differences that threaten membership can be suppressed and tamed.

Of course, these truisms long predate their most recent uses in the post September 11th world, in which commentators are still falling over each other in their race to identify the timeless principles and core values of the Islamic tradition. Although it is tempting to say that such pundits are drawing on an intellectual tradition, in keeping with my tactical goals, I’d prefer not to lodge our object of study within the confines of the disembodied mind. Instead, I choose to refer to it as a loosely related network of political actors distinguished by a common rhetorical strategy that they employ to achieve a variety of practical ends. That strategy is nicely represented in the U.S. by the still celebrated nineteenth-century psychologist, William James
Although the privatization, or sentimentalization, of what might otherwise be understood as contestable interests and contingent preferences, goes back much further than James’s writings on religion, his work provides a useful example of this technique, if for no other reason than the continued utility of James’s writings for those who use it to authorize their own views concerning just what (and therefore who) gets to count as authentically human.

Near the opening of a chapter entitled, “The Value of Saintliness,” in his famous Gifford Lectures of 1901-1902 (soon after published as The Varieties of Religious Experience [1902]2), James writes as follows:

The word ‘religion,’ as ordinarily used, is equivocal. A survey of history shows us that, as a rule, religious geniuses attract disciples, and produce groups of sympathizers. When these groups get strong enough to ‘organize’ themselves, they become ecclesiastical institutions with corporate ambitions of their own. The spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally innocent thing; so that when we hear the word ‘religion’ nowadays, we think inevitably of some ‘church’ or other; and to some persons the word ‘church’ suggests so much hypocrisy and tyranny and meanness and tenacity of superstition that in a wholesale undiscerning way they glory in saying that they are ‘down’ on religion altogether. (1985: 334-5)

There may be no more succinct statement of the position whose practical effects I am inviting you to consider. To sum up, James makes three key assumptions:

1. An inner, pure, and dynamic experience is both logically and chronologically prior to historically-embedded human behavior (i.e., “the originally innocent thing”);

2. This experience is best exemplified in individuals who, by means of their charisma, are the driving force of a social group’s development and growth (i.e., “religious geniuses”);

3. Once organized, the public behavior of the genius’s followers, insomuch as it is but an expression of the prior, inner sentiment, is prone to deterioration and, lamentably, apt to be bogged down by such things as doctrine, ritual, and institution (i.e., “dogmatic rule”)
With all this in mind, James understandably says from the outset that his study is devoted not to the “ordinary religious believer, who follows the conventional observances of his country ... [for] his religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit.” Given his presumption that the driving force in history is the spark that is thought to animate the lone, charismatic genius—what amounts to a highly individualist sociology—it makes sense that James concludes that “[i]t would profit us little to study this second-hand religious life” (6). Instead, he focuses exclusively on what he calls the “acute fever” of the lone religious genius who possesses “the original experiences which were the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct” (6).

Although it may now seem to be a quaint relic from a bygone era, this nineteenth-century rhetoric of dynamic spirituality versus stifling institution is alive and well today. For example, consider how, precisely one hundred years after James delivered these words in Edinburgh, another Gifford lecturer drew on the same distinctions. In a series of lectures delivered in Vienna not long after his own 1999 Gifford lectures, Charles Taylor—the well known philosopher and author of such works as Sources of the Self (1989) and The Ethics of Authenticity (1991)—celebrated James’s influence while attempting to update his thesis, to take into account that the social expression of religious experience may itself be but one more variety of religion. Because James “has trouble getting beyond a certain individualism,” as Taylor phrases it (2002: 23), he failed to understand “the phenomenon of collective religious life” (24); so Taylor proposes, in his little book Varieties of Religion Today, to update James by having us entertain that “the link between the believer and the divine (or whatever), may be essentially mediated by corporate, ecclesial life” (23; emphasis added).
At this point we must pause to consider whether the social dimension that Taylor introduces ought to be understood as a gain for those of us who wish to take seriously that human beings are unavoidably historical, social creatures enmeshed in political worlds and are not, as James assumed, lamentably stuck with history, much as the proverbial ghost is inhibited by the machine. So I ask: Is it a gain to learn from Taylor that “[t]he ideas, the understanding with which we live our lives, shape directly what we could call religious experience; and these languages, these vocabularies, are never those simply of the individual” (28; emphasis added).

To answer this question I draw specific attention to some of the words used in his text: experience, we learn, is enhanced and shaped. Although I wish not to place too much emphasis on the choice of a single word, it strikes me as profoundly significant that Taylor is not arguing that ones history and social location determine or cause certain things and moments to stand out as an experience. Instead, along with James, Taylor posits the existence of some sort of inner spark that is expressed publicly to varying degrees of satisfaction and sophistication. Of course Taylor does not lament the limitations of this public expression to the extent that James did; but, nonetheless, they agree on the autonomy and thus priority of the inner world over the outer, insomuch as the outer merely provides a shape for the dynamism of the inner. This is none other than the common technique of determining the meaning of a text or the significance of a behavior by reading them into their varied contexts; although this seems to be a significant gain for the socially-inclined scholar, the many contexts in which some action is performed or some text is read are merely presumed to comprise the contingent medium that houses the manifested expression of a prior thing we call meaning or intention. So, despite Taylor’s promise to update James’s individualistic sociology, we see that truisms die hard.
But just why are such truisms problematic? To answer this, consider the example that Taylor uses to make his argument stick.

I am sitting at home watching the local hockey team win the Stanley Cup. I rejoice in this. But the sense of my joy here is framed by my understanding that thousands of fans all over the city, some gathered at rinkside, others also in their living rooms, are sharing this moment of exultation.

With this example in mind, he concludes:

There are certain emotions you can have in solidarity that you can’t have alone; the experience mutates into something else by the fact that it is shared. How much of what James thinks of as individual experience is socially enhanced or affected in this way? (28-9; emphasis added)

As a displaced Canadian from southern Ontario who grew up a died-in-the-wool Toronto Maple Leafs hockey fan (whose sworn enemies, as you know, are the fans of the Montreal Canadiens, the “local hockey team” to which Taylor—an emeritus professor of philosophy and political science at McGill University in Montreal—no doubt refers), I too have had my share of solitary experiences of joy while watching hockey on television—in fact, I had one last Spring when ESPN was kind enough to broadcast the game in which Toronto advanced to the quarter finals of last year’s playoffs. But if you knew the Leafs’ win/loss record since they last won a championship in 1967, you’d also know that I’ve had more than my fair share of solitary experiences of disappointment as well. However, having lived and worked in the U.S. south for over a decade, I would no longer call myself a hockey fan since games are rarely broadcast and, when they are, the play-by-play announcers often describe it to their audience in such a way that an afficionado of the game feels like an untutored moron. For example, as some of you may know, one U.S. television network once experimented with a computer enhanced graphic that provided the televised image of the hockey puck with a colorful aura as it zipped around the rink,
supposedly making it easier for fans to follow. As one weaned on televised hockey games instead of baseball or golf, and hence not all that accustomed to watching a tiny white ball soar against a faint blue sky, I could never figure out why television executives thought that a black puck moving across white ice was all that difficult for their viewers to see.

That I found it patronizing for the network to fiddle with what I guess I should call my experience of the game makes it all too obvious that the social location of my beginnings in the Great White North, and my current placement south of the Mason-Dixon Line, have indeed—just as Taylor argues—shaped my experience. But as I first read Taylor’s hockey example, it dawned on me just how wide of the mark he was in using it to make his point. Perhaps this is because I read his book while preparing to teach it to a group of undergraduate students in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, where frost and ice, let alone snow, are seldom seen and where you must order “hot tea” to get what I once thought was simply called “tea.” It soon became apparent to me that what he presents as inner emotions (e.g., his feelings of joy and exultation), that are enhanced in a social setting (e.g., watching the big game with friends at a local bar), are hardly pre-social dispositions that are merely shaped, mediated, and framed by the location of their expression. For my students—for whom “arena” signifies somewhere that you play basketball, not hockey, and, moreover, for whom “hockey” is known as “ice hockey”—had trouble understanding an argument that took for granted that exultation attends watching your team win what the initiated simply refer to as “the Cup.” I would therefore argue that the experience of the game is itself the product of—and is not simply shaped or framed by—differing social locations. Or, as phrased by the historian of architecture, Witold Rybczynski: “A recreational vehicle in the rain is just a wet metal box; a screened porch with wide, sheltering eaves is a place to experience the rain” (1990:}
49). Applied to Taylor’s example, Rybczynski’s point is that the frame does not enhance the picture; instead, the frame transforms limitless and centerless background into a picture much as the comforting porch makes the rain into something one can sit back and experience rather than something to dread while hydroplaning down the Trans Canada Highway. To phrase it in terms of text and context, it is not simply that the context is the site at which the text’s prior meaning is expressed but, instead, the text and its meaning are both an effect of a prior context comprised of, in our case here today, the rules of English grammar and a set of social preferences that value listening patiently while someone such as myself drones on. Fail to learn these conventions and our present experience is hardly worth plumbing for its deep meaning. Simply put, put a copy of National Geographic Magazine in an outhouse a hundred years ago and it doesn’t take a genius to know that it’s not there for its meaning.

What Taylor therefore fails to see—but what is more than evident to anyone who does not share his northern social setting—is that, regardless the apparent sincerity of his claims or the supposed depth of his convictions, the joy and exultation he feels whenever a small black rubber disk crosses the other team’s goal line, accompanied by a red light, a siren, and the broadcaster proclaiming, “He shoots, He scores!,” are internalized echoes of a very particular, contingent social world that made it possible for this biological individual to experience himself as a hockey fan. It’s therefore not that the inner emotion mutates when it is shared; the fact of reporting that we are having this or that inner emotion is evidence that a lot of sharing has already taken place! Surely these social echoes (a.k.a. emotions) can be reinforced and thus compounded, based on such factors as whether other people are also in the room cheering or, instead, trying to wrestle the remote control from your cold dead hand, but this does not lessen the fact that the game is not
inherently joyous, exciting, or boring. Although I beg you not to share this with my own university’s alumni association, just because I cannot sit through an entire U.S. college football game says little, if anything at all, about the activity itself; instead, it says everything about the expectations I have learned regarding such things as how I ought to spend my time on a Saturday afternoon.

We can therefore conclude—quoting James’s own words but without his accompanying tone of lamentation—that Taylor’s emotional response to the game, even his sense of certain social activities being games, “has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit.” For, prior to the advent of our social frames, prior to the well-meaning but no less coercive adults who leaned in close to us as babies, saying “B-b-b-b-b-b...,” there was no game, let alone exultation and joy, suggesting to us that an intellectual hunt for the Holy Grail of individual emotion, charisma, genius, piety, principle, or experience is a misguided quest for it amplifies the echoes of just one particular social world, thereby representing it—and this is the problem with these truisms—as if it inhabited an eternal present. Thus, Taylor’s attempt to shift some of the weight of James’s analysis from the “private breast” displaces nothing; for by giving a thin social veneer to supposedly pristine inner emotions Taylor reinscribes the priority of the stable center adrift in the tempestuous seas of historical happenstance. Such sentimentalization political processes and contests amounts to ahistorical obscurantism insomuch as it hides from view the haphazard manner in which ones context leads to differing experiences of the world. And by hiding the happenstance from view, it hides the choices and accidents that led to just this, rather than that, experience, thereby naturalizing what was in fact a contestable “one among many.” Accordingly,
rhetorics of origin, privacy, authenticity, spirit, tradition, essence, faith, along with the common distinctions between belief/practice and between private/public, are endlessly useful political techniques that massage and manage an unruly social world that generally does not meet with any group’s expectations. These rhetorics therefore fulfill a crucial management role by seeming to privatize, and thereby either domesticate and suppress or naturalize and legitimate, certain forms of inescapably public action and organization—much as Taylor’s experience of joy authorized a specific social world by suppressing the fact that it could have been otherwise.

My hope is that you see that research into the category “religion” is not simply an idle dispute over the names that we give to real things in the world, such as private and public, sacred and secular. Instead, it involves an investigation into the links between these classifications and explicit disputes over socio-political turf, status, and identity. For example, if you consider a case such as the recent accusations made against a number of Roman Catholic priests, you quickly see that at the heart of these sexual abuse lawsuits is the issue of legal jurisdiction (i.e., turf!); for, as lawyers for the Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles have argued, “civil authorities don’t have the constitutional right to intervene in church affairs” (Lobdell and Winton 2003: B6). Yet, in basing their position concerning the private, and thus privileged, nature of bishop-priest communications on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution we see a wonderful irony; for in liberal democracies the State classifies certain mass movements and voluntary associations as religions, thereby granting to them a degree of latitude in their self-policing activities. The collectivity known as the State therefore creates the zone known as religion and, by lodging it within the confines of individuals’ private experience, expressed in their politically ineffective rituals and forms of worship, the State thereby establishes the conditions by means of which a
specific sort of public collectivity—namely, itself—can come into existence.

Taking James’s own words more seriously than he might have liked, we can say that there is indeed a “spirit of politics,” for discourses on faith are now understood to be a product of very public political rhetoric, a means for establishing a system for dogmatic rule—whether that system is of the left or the right. As phrased by the University of Regina’s, William Arnal, “the modern democratic state in fact creates religion as its alter-ego: religion, as such, is the space in which and by which any substantive collective goals ... are individualized and made into a question of personal commitment or morality” (2000: 32). Apparently, St. George and the dragon—savior and demon—not only require one another in order to play their respective roles, but are one and the same.

If so, then—contrary to the popular opinion among scholars—it is not the case that the once dynamic and pervasive life of the spirit was coercively privatized and that it will, perhaps, one day rise from the ashes to defeat secularism in order to reclaim its rightful throne. Instead, what we today so commonly call faith, belief, experience, and spirituality can now be seen as the products of an effective and all too public rhetorical technique of governance; somewhat like Charles Taylor’s emotions, they are internalized echoes of behaviors and types of organization—but unlike Taylor’s joy, they are evidence of those that too aggressively contest some presumed status quo. As with the case of the seventeenth-century British dissenters studied by the late Marxist historian, Christopher Hill (2000), only by means of that picture frame we know as privatization or sentimentalization can certain forms of collective life appear as natural, thereby standing out from the background of conflicting social practices. All others are either condemned as fanatical aberrations—as in the now widely used category “political Islam”—or
tolerated as merely curious and thereby celebrated in our museums of multicultural wonders. For, as Hill concludes in his study of the historic roots and political effects of discourses on tolerance: “Once dissenters had accepted their position as a subordinate part of the nation, with freedom of religious worship at the expense of exclusion from central and local government and from the universities, a modus vivendi [or way of living] could be worked out.... Dissenters, or most of them, now asked only to be left alone.... Toleration proved a more effective way of controlling dissent than persecution” (40, 43). After all, the alternative to recasting your dissenting behaviors as private opinions was, at least in seventeenth-century England, either imprisonment or death.³

While both of these options remain for those in power who seek to curtail behaviors that stray too far afield from so-called accepted standards of civility, there is now a third option. For with the advent of a rhetorical split between belief and practice, between ones so-called private and public selves, dissenters can now roll their eyes and grumble under their breath while participating in voluntary associations that we come to know as religions, where specifically constrained differences flourish. For, as the critical theorist Theodor Adorno wrote, a certain form of “activism is tolerated only because it is viewed as pseudo-activity” (2002: 200-1). So long as difference remains at this level of pseudo-activity—what we might classify as rituals or merely symbolic behaviors in contradistinction to public, political activity, or what the literary critic Stanley Fish names “surface pieties ... abstractions without substantive bite” (2002: 38)—it is greeted as, in Adorno’s words, mere theater and opinion, and thus tolerated because it is so easily ignored. The trouble, of course, comes when deeply held yet oppositional beliefs are put into practice—and this we in the civilized world call terrorism.

Learning to hear talk of religion, meaning, faith, experience, spirituality, intention, etc., as
nothing more or less than artful social rhetorics used by potentially conflicting historical agents to “reason around” the complexities and ambiguities of their daily lives, is therefore at the heart of the project to rethink the category “religion.” Much as some people hear FOX News’s claim to being “fair and balanced” as nothing other than a ploy that accomplishes political work, such a project will lead us to reconsider a widely accepted series of oppositions, seeing them instead as sites where forms of social engineering have been taking place all along. Efforts to rethink “religion” are but a part of a larger effort to map the socio-rhetorical conditions that have helped to make possible the largest social formation that—for good or ill—we have so far come up with: this thing we call the modern, liberal-democratic nation-state in which diverse people with potentially conflicting interests become equal citizens whose uniform behavior is premised on their having richly dynamic interior lives of faith and the inalienable right to believe anything they like—so long as they don’t put the wrong beliefs into practice. Rethinking “religion” is therefore concerned with the ways in which discourses on faith, in contradistinction to practice, help to make possible a social site where—to borrow some phrasing from the scholar of antiquity, Peter Brown—members of groups can “iron out the tensions and anomalies of real life” (2003: 18). That the anomalies of modern life that need to be ironed out are often other human beings who fail to have the good manners to pursue their competing interests in the privacy of their idle hearts and minds, cannot go unnoticed.4

Notes

1. This essay is based on chapter 1 of McCutcheon forthcoming a; in addition, a small portion of the argument is borrowed from McCutcheon forthcoming b. My thanks to Kurtis Schaeffer for commenting on an earlier draft of this lecture.


4. Although not necessarily cited, the preceding argument is indebted to the work of such writers as William Arnal (2000, 2001); Talal Asad (1993, 1999, 2003); Daniel Dubuisson (2003); Tim Fitzgerald (1997, 2000, 2003a); Gary Lease (1994); Attila Molnár (2002); and Malory Nye (2000). As an example of a recent exchange on this topic, one that nicely demonstrates the often emotionally charged nature of this debate, see Fitzgerald (2003b), Reader’s reply (2004) and Fitzgerald’s response (2004). For additional background to this argument, see: McCutcheon 2001: chapter 10; McCutcheon 2003: chapter 12; and McCutcheon 2004.

References


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